A [NR1]relatively recent addition to the American military industrial complex is the growth of the privatized military firm, or PMF. Classified in three major categories according to function, PMFs seek not to privatize the development and production of military goods, but to privatize the provision and application of military services. These military services range from logistical support and transportation, to training and advising, to armed para-military “security” forces and aerial reconnaissance or strike missions. There are even several foreign-based PMFs that have the capability to place a significant self-contained military combat unit on the ground anywhere in the world, complete with artillery and air support – all for the right price of course.
PMFs that openly perform combat duties have strong ancestral ties to the Swiss Guard and other organized mercenary companies of years past. Known as active or category one firms, the ex-Soviet Spetsnaz “Alpha Brigade” and the now-defunct “Executive Outcomes” of South Africa are prime examples. PMFs involved in training and advising of American and foreign military forces fall under the classification of advisory or category two PMFs. These are firms such as American-based MPRI, which in addition to running US Army ROTC programs has trained and developed the militaries of several foreign nations. Third category or administrative PMFs are firms such as Brown & Root Services, which has provided transportation, maintenance, and logistical support for the US military since its first contract in 1992.[1]
Though private military firms that hire themselves out to national governments for combat or training duties as an organized company of mercenaries is not a new idea, what the PMFs have begun to do in the United States is new and provokes, for perhaps the first time, the possibility of the United States privatizing a greater or lesser portion of its military combat power. Additionally, privatized military firms have become a very real part of the American military industrial complex as it stands right now by offering to provide certain capabilities more efficiently than the Department of Defense can provide for itself.[2]
Perhaps the most tantalizing possibility of the increased capability and usage of privatized military firms is the privatization of certain (or all) combat functions of the United States military. Militarily, a privatized system may be workable if the expectations for usage of the American military were radically changed to focus much less on overseas deployment and more on protection of the physical United States and our direct interests. Though a system in which, for example, Ford, Lockheed, and John Deer would compete to provide the Department of Defense with a combat wing of unmanned combat aerial vehicles would provide undeniable economic benefits, efficiencies, and more rapid adaptation of new technology, the concerns of such a system would outweigh any benefits. Questions could arise as to whether the private combat forces owed allegiance to the United States or to their direct employer. Other nations utilizing private combat forces have already experienced problems with “agent principal abandonment”, situations in which the hired forces either leave before contract fulfillment or pursue their own objectives to the detriment of the hiring nation[NR2].[3]
The growth of PMFs will continue as companies show interest in developing or purchasing military components as a form of diversification. Evergreen Helicopter Services is an example of a firm that earns a large part of its income by filling civilian consumer needs. Evergreen provides helicopter services for firefighting, construction, rescue, and many other reasons. In addition to its civilian fleet, Evergreen maintains a capability to fly missions in support of peacekeeping operations – such as reconnaissance, transport, and even light attack. In another example CSC, a computer security and consulting firm, has purchased DynCorp, a para-military security firm. Here we see a firm with an established market in one area looking to add a military component, allowing it to now provide security services for physical as well as informational property. Before the era of privatized military firms Henry Ford did much the same thing by seeking certain military contracts for Ford motor company.[4]
Regardless of the future role of the privatized military firm, proper integration of the private and the governmental will be crucial to ensuring that PMFs are a factor that strengthens, not weakens, the armed forces of the United States in their role to protect the freedoms of the American people and to achieve success in the national military goals.
[1] P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 138.
[3] P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 159.
[NR1]PMF chapter.
[NR2]MAIN ARGUMENT (tentative):
National defense need not be a purely public good.
It is conceivable that our nation would shift to reliance on 1st degree PMFs.
This would force a more precise use of force away from the borders of the US
Tactical Pro; greater flexibility and adaptability of new methods / tech.
Tactical Con; less resilience to attrition.
CNTRPNT – both money AND “home” would motivate.
On defense yea, but not abroad.
US of A would be forced to severely restrict overseas deployments.
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