Wednesday, April 20, 2005
Meanwhile, in Fairfax
Today's random thought: Does business productivity go up in offices with windows on nice days? Or does productivity decrease?
Life is good, my God is good, friends are good, school is hard.
Private Military?
A [NR1] relatively recent addition to the American military industrial complex is the growth of the privatized military firm, or PMF. Classified in three major categories according to function, PMFs seek not to privatize the development and production of military goods, but to privatize the provision and application of military services. These military services range from logistical support and transportation, to training and advising, to armed para-military “security” forces and aerial reconnaissance or strike missions. There are even several foreign-based PMFs that have the capability to place a significant self-contained military combat unit on the ground anywhere in the world, complete with artillery and air support – all for the right price of course.
PMFs that openly perform combat duties have strong ancestral ties to the Swiss Guard and other organized mercenary companies of years past. Known as active or category one firms, the ex-Soviet Spetsnaz “Alpha Brigade” and the now-defunct “Executive Outcomes” of South Africa are prime examples. PMFs involved in training and advising of American and foreign military forces fall under the classification of advisory or category two PMFs. These are firms such as American-based MPRI, which in addition to running US Army ROTC programs has trained and developed the militaries of several foreign nations. Third category or administrative PMFs are firms such as Brown & Root Services, which has provided transportation, maintenance, and logistical support for the US military since its first contract in 1992.[1]
Though private military firms that hire themselves out to national governments for combat or training duties as an organized company of mercenaries is not a new idea, what the PMFs have begun to do in the United States is new and provokes, for perhaps the first time, the possibility of the United States privatizing a greater or lesser portion of its military combat power. Additionally, privatized military firms have become a very real part of the American military industrial complex as it stands right now by offering to provide certain capabilities more efficiently than the Department of Defense can provide for itself.[2]
Perhaps the most tantalizing possibility of the increased capability and usage of privatized military firms is the privatization of certain (or all) combat functions of the United States military. Militarily, a privatized system may be workable if the expectations for usage of the American military were radically changed to focus much less on overseas deployment and more on protection of the physical United States and our direct interests. Though a system in which, for example, Ford, Lockheed, and John Deer would compete to provide the Department of Defense with a combat wing of unmanned combat aerial vehicles would provide undeniable economic benefits, efficiencies, and more rapid adaptation of new technology, the concerns of such a system would outweigh any benefits. Questions could arise as to whether the private combat forces owed allegiance to the United States or to their direct employer. Other nations utilizing private combat forces have already experienced problems with “agent principal abandonment”, situations in which the hired forces either leave before contract fulfillment or pursue their own objectives to the detriment of the hiring nation[NR2] .[3]
The growth of PMFs will continue as companies show interest in developing or purchasing military components as a form of diversification. Evergreen Helicopter Services is an example of a firm that earns a large part of its income by filling civilian consumer needs. Evergreen provides helicopter services for firefighting, construction, rescue, and many other reasons. In addition to its civilian fleet, Evergreen maintains a capability to fly missions in support of peacekeeping operations – such as reconnaissance, transport, and even light attack. In another example CSC, a computer security and consulting firm, has purchased DynCorp, a para-military security firm. Here we see a firm with an established market in one area looking to add a military component, allowing it to now provide security services for physical as well as informational property. Before the era of privatized military firms Henry Ford did much the same thing by seeking certain military contracts for Ford motor company.[4]
Regardless of the future role of the privatized military firm, proper integration of the private and the governmental will be crucial to ensuring that PMFs are a factor that strengthens, not weakens, the armed forces of the United States in their role to protect the freedoms of the American people and to achieve success in the national military goals.
[1] P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 138.
[3] P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 159.
[NR1]PMF chapter.
[NR2]MAIN ARGUMENT (tentative):
National defense need not be a purely public good.
It is conceivable that our nation would shift to reliance on 1st degree PMFs.
This would force a more precise use of force away from the borders of the US
Tactical Pro; greater flexibility and adaptability of new methods / tech.
Tactical Con; less resilience to attrition.
CNTRPNT – both money AND “home” would motivate.
On defense yea, but not abroad.
US of A would be forced to severely restrict overseas deployments.
Sunday, April 17, 2005
Just a short one, yeah right...
So, I didn't post my writing group paper last week. I'll post last week's now, and this weeks in a day or two. Have fun Dame und Herr.
Is Michigan job loss really such a puzzle?
For over one hundred years, Michigan was an industrial and productive capstone. A wealth of natural resources launched Michigan to the top of lumber, copper, and iron production. The Michigan business environment allowed several major entrepreneurs to take root and flourish. Kellog, Dow, Ford, R.E.Olds, these men and others like them carried Michigan to a position of industrial and technological leadership. As recently as the mid 1990s, the city of Lansing produced more cars than any other city on earth.
Yet now Michigan has the 36th most hostile business environment, with business taxes 50% higher than the average. Though still possessing key chemical and industrial capability, Michigan is certainly in a downward spiral. Unfortunately, the governor’s office is taking the route of government intervention and micromanagement, activities that do nothing to reassure businesses that the state government will not change the rules mid-game or raise taxes to pay for the next “great idea”.
Two instances in particular bear review, one because it is recent, and the other because of the sheer magnitude of the repercussions that can be expected.
The most recent ‘great idea’, and a prime example of the micromanagement that has become typical of this administration, involves further expenditure of state Medicaid money to create jobs in assisted living facilities. On April fifth, two thousand and five, WZZM News reported on Granholm’s "Jobs Today Jobs Tomorrow" initiative.[1] In a nutshell, this initiative would pay an additional five dollars per day for each Medicaid recipient residing at a facility. The governor intends that this money be reinvested in new construction and new staff, turned around and reanimated as additional Michigan jobs. Granholm is quoted in the article as stating that this program would provide approximately an additional $91,000 a year for each fifty residents on Medicaid at a facility. Though the program is labeled by the governor’s office as “revenue neutral”, it is unclear where, in a state budget $375,000,000 in the red,[2] the money to pay this extra $1800 per person would come from. Perhaps most dismayingly of all, Granholm is quoted in the article as saying that this initiative is anticipated to create five thousand jobs over the next three years, many of them temporary jobs relating to construction, but some nurses and other permanent staff. For a project that will currently cost an estimated $638,750,000 per year,[3] why settle for merely five thousand jobs of uncertain duration? What would happen instead if the state did not spend that money at all, but demonstrated restraint in tapping the pockets of residents and taxpayers – an effect, that if maintained, would surely increase the willingness of employers to locate in Michigan. Touted as a quick, temporary, fix, I see “Jobs Today Jobs Tomorrow” as instead becoming a permanent part of state Medicaid, ever more expensive as the allotment is pushed higher and higher.
The second example deserves more space than it will receive, but has also already been the subject of many writings and so will only be very briefly discussed here. 690 acres of land in southeast Michigan were put up for auction with two legislated requirements – that the bid accepted must equal or exceed estimated market price, and that the state retain water/mineral rights. Of the two bids; one met the criteria and one did not. The appraised value was $11.5M, the high bid was $25M, and the low bid of $9M was also contingent on obtaining all water/mineral rights. Despite the no-brainer that would seem to be dictated by constraints of the legislature, the governor’s office proceeded with selling the land to the low-bidder, supported by new legislation passed after the bidding.[4] Not surprisingly, the high-bidder filed suit, and, though rebuffed once, is continuing to appeal.[5]
Though there is still hope that the high-bidder will prevail, this incident has sent an unfortunate message to corporations; the only sure way of starting or expanding business in Michigan is to be the politically favored party, otherwise you may find the rug pulled out from under you. Businessmen do not like unpredictability. Nor do they like seeing signs that a state government cannot keep is hands in its own pockets. Result: Do business – and provide jobs – elsewhere.
Wednesday, April 13, 2005
Hooo RAH!
Oh yeah, I guess you'd want a link. http://hanson.gmu.edu/PAMpress.pdf
Wednesday, April 06, 2005
Following up my last post.
Game theory and the Schliefen Plan: Part Two
Assuming that both Germany and Russia were rational actors at the start of World War One, Germany must have had a perspective on its payoffs for going to war with Russia in support of Austria versus not going to war and allowing Austria to be defeated that caused “war” to be the rational choice at the time. Despite the horror of war, and in hindsight the particular horror of World War One, Germany acted on the time-tested practices of sticking with good, reliable, military allies (Austria) and not allowing timeworn enemies (Russia) to increase its sphere of military and diplomatic influence – which a military victory over the Austrians would certainly do. Additionally, at the start of World War One very few military minds had any idea of the military quagmire that would result from the first major applications of chemical weapons, new artillery weapons and techniques, the massed use of machineguns, and the contrary fortunes of war. However, in deciding to go to war with Russia, Germany acted as if expecting that no other nation would use the same thought process and logic in deciding whether to declare war on Germany as a result of German military actions.
The Schliefen Plan was the plan by which the entire German nation would go to war. As a result of the political and military climate, the only conceivable situation was one in which Germany would find itself fighting both France and Russia simultaneously. As France was expected to be able to mobilize an effective army and invade Germany sooner, the Schliefen was fully structured around the idea of swinging all possible German military might against France and knocking them out of the war within six weeks, then rapidly moving the German army to the eastern front and confronting Russia. Such was the inflexibility of the Schliefen Plan that if Germany found itself facing imminent conflict with Russia, they would be forced to attack France. This firm commitment was expected to give France cause to exert pressure on their ally, Russia, to stay in line.
So when Germany decided to honor their treaty obligations with Austria, they found themselves virtually required to attack France and force a peace as quickly as possible – though France was not initiating conflict nor even threatening to do so (why not just skip to the “move the army east” phase I don’t understand). The German staff felt that their best chance at a quick victory in France lay in attacking through Belgium.
Though the Belgian people and king had taken a strong posture of fighting to maintain complete sovereignty, Germany expected that as German troops actually crossed the border the Belgian government and military would accede to German demands for uncontested passage through the little nation. After all, the whole point of such posturing is to keep other nations out, not cause the devastation of your own nation by refusing to allow passage once the invader is already in, right? Game theory sub-game perfection would say yes, once it is clear that your initial strategy has not worked, do that which is most advantageous. Instead, Belgium fought – and they did not fight alone.
Belgium had recently signed a treaty with Great Britain stating that the British would both respect Belgian neutrality/sovereignty and exert military force to ensure others did as well. Despite knowledge of this treaty, the Germans, using game theoretical reasoning similar to that above, in no way expected England to actually go to war over “a mere scrap of paper”, instead expecting that England would back down from the treaty once Germany actually invaded Belgium and Great Britain saw that war was reality. In short, though the Germans seem to have violated basic precept of game theory in going to war, they expected both Belgium and England to adhere to sub-game perfection and allow Germany to march through Belgium unopposed.
What this tragic episode from history show us it not a failure of game theory, but rather, assuming rational actors, that incentives and perceived payoffs must be clearly understood by all involved. Information is key. For the Germans, it made the difference between a quick victory over France and a long drawn-out catastrophic defeat.